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Abstract
It is often assumed that transfers received from governments, non-
government organizations (NGOs), friends and relatives help rural
households to pool risk. In this paper I investigate two functions of
transfers in Ethiopia: risk pooling and income redistribution. Unlike
most of the literature this paper investigates not only whether but
also how much risk pooling is achieved. I find evidence that trans-
fers from governments/NGOs play a role in insuring covariant income
shocks, (weak) evidence that transfers from friends/relatives insure id-
iosyncratic income shocks and evidence that transfers target the poor
households. However, the contributions of transfers to risk pooling
and income redistribution are economically very limited.
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1 Introduction
Risk is a major issue in developing countries. Townsend (1994) found that in
the villages in southern India erratic monsoon rain causes high agricultural
risk; crop and human diseases are also prevalent. Lybbert et al. (2004) claim
that among the pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands of eastern and
southern Africa, livestock losses during one cycle of drought and recovery
can be up to 50% to 80% for cattle and 30% for sheep and goats.
Like their counterparts in other developing countries, farmers in Ethiopian
villages also face all kinds of shocks in their lives. In the Ethiopia Rural
Household Survey (ERHS), farmers were asked to list the shocks they expe-
rienced in 1999–2004. Among the households, 52% of them reported drought,
38% reported pests or diseases affecting crops or livestock and 35% reported
death of a household member. Households use several ways to deal with
these types of risk. One posibility is through savings like accumulating and
decumulating assets (e.g. Deaton 1991). They can also diversify their land
into various crops (e.g. Dercon 1996), adjust their activities like shifting la-
bor from farm to off-farm employment (e.g. Kochar 1999), share labor and
livestock, take loans (Udry 1990, 1994) and get transfers.
In this paper I focus on risk pooling through transfers using ERHS data.
Studies from many countries have shown that households are not fully in-
sured. For example, Townsend (1994) found that only partial insurance
exists in southern Indian villages by studying the relation between house-
hold’s income and consumption. Udry (1994) also rejects the existence of
full insurance by studying the borrowing and lending behavior of the house-
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holds in northern Nigeria. Different from the literature which tests for the
existence of full insurance and gives only yes/no answers, this paper studies
how much risk pooling is achieved through transfers. I develop a measure of
shocks, investigate the functions of transfers and measure the contribution
of transfers to risk pooling.
The data provide information on transfers from two sources: governments
and non-government organizations (NGOs), and household’s own social net-
works. Governments and NGOs provide food aid and food-for-work programs
to poor households to help them in bad times. A large amount of food aid is
distributed every year. The annual volume of cereal food aid has ranged be-
tween 3.5% and 26% of total domestic food grain production over the 1985–96
period (Clay, Molla and Habtewold 1999). However, the targeting of food
aid is poor: Dercon and Krishnan (2003) report that the characteristics of
those who obtained aid and those who did not differ very little.
Besides the external aid from governments and NGOs, in rural areas in
Ethiopia mutual support is very common. In good years households support
the households suffering negative shocks and in bad years they get support
from other households. The social networks in which such risk pooling oc-
curs can be informal, based on kinship, friendship or religion. There are
also semi-formal organizations in rural Ethiopia. These organizations re-
quire membership and fees, and provide support to their members in bad
times. For example, the funeral association iddir is prevalent in Ethiopia.
The institution collects contributions from its members and pays out to the
household when a member or relations of a member dies (Hoddinott, Dercon
and Krishnan 2005). The support from the household’s own social networks
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constitutes the second source of the transfers. Hoddinott et al. (2005) study
the networks in ERHS villages and find that many households have connec-
tions to different sorts of social networks.
In this paper I explore two functions of transfers. It is well known that shocks
can have persistent effects on growth (e.g. Dercon 2004 provides evidence of
this for Ethiopia). Transfers may try to target the households who are suffer-
ing from negative shocks and let the households who are experiencing positive
shocks pay. From this point of view, transfers work like an insurance which
collects premiums from households with positive shocks and compensates the
households with negative shocks. It is obvious that households with negative
shocks are not necessarily poor households. Transfers may try to target not
only the unlucky households but also the poor households. Transfers are then
used to reallocate income from rich households to poor households. In this
case, transfers do not depend on shocks but depend on income differentials.
Two measures of shocks are constructed in this paper: covariant income
shocks and idiosyncratic income shocks. By decomposing the shocks in this
way, I study the roles transfers from governments/NGOs and friends/relatives
play in insuring these two types of shocks separately. The fact that Ethiopian
farmers face high risks has caught the attention of many researchers (e.g.
Dercon 2004 and Dercon, Hoddinott and Woldehanna 2005) but these papers
only use indices of the shocks or dummy variables to measure the shocks. In
this paper I use continuous rather than discrete measures of shocks which are
constructed from a regression of income on income determinants. Functions
of transfers and how much risk pooling the households can achieve through
transfers are studied based on the shocks I construct. Since measurement er-
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rors may remain as with any measure of the shocks on household income, and
the constructed shocks may suffer from the problem of endogeneity coming
from the omitted variables in the income regression, instrumental variables
estimation is used to consistently measure how much risk pooling is achieved.
I find evidence that transfers go to the households suffering negative shocks
and to poor households. Covariant shocks are found to be insured by trans-
fers from governments/NGOs and transfers from friends/relatives play a weak
role in insuring idiosyncratic shocks. However, the contribution of transfers
on risk pooling is limited and economically insignificant.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the description of the data
set. In section 3, I will study the contribution of transfers on risk pooling
and redistribution by giving the econometric specification and discussing the
results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data
The data used in this paper are from the Ethiopia Rural Household Sur-
vey (ERHS). The survey data are collected by the Economics Department
of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the Center for the Study
of African Economies at Oxford University and the International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute. It is one of the few panel data sets available at the
household level in Africa. In 1989 around 450 households in six sites were
initially surveyed; these were selected for a famine study. Three more sites
were added in 1994–1995 to include areas north of Debre Birhan, which could
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not be surveyed in 1989 due to military conflict. Six other sites were also
added to cover the main agroclimatic zones and farming systems of the richer
parts of the country. In total 1477 households were surveyed in the begin-
ning of 1994. Stratification was used to include a sufficient coverage of the
main farming systems and to ensure that female and landless households
were included. These households have been re-interviewed several times sub-
sequently. New survey rounds took place in the second half of 1994, in 1995,
1997, 1999 and 2004. The data from the first five of the seven rounds are
publicly available. Since the 1989 survey uses a very different questionnaire
from the later rounds and also covered different villages, I only use the data
from the 1994 (two rounds), 1995 and 1997 surveys in this paper.1
The data set provides detailed information on household income and assets
as well as transfers, which makes it suitable for the use of this paper. Means
of household income and assets can be found in Table 1. The income data are
collected by asking about four sources of household income: farm income,
labor income, livestock income and transfer income. Land is allocated by
Peasant Associations (PA) in Ethiopia. Selling land is illegal though renting
and share-cropping exist. Livestock are the most important productive as-
sets for the households in the surveyed villages. The other productive assets
like hoes and plows are only 7% of the livestock in value2.
As the survey was designed in 1989 for studying the drought in 1984-1985,
questions about shocks were asked in each round of the survey. For exam-
ple, information about rainfall and shocks on crops is provided by the data.
The data also contain information about changes of household members, and
birth and death of livestock. However, since the questions are mainly in the
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form of yes/no, the data do not contain much quantitative information of
risk. Thus in this paper I measure risk based on observed income.
The ERHS data provide information about households’ transfer income from
which the amount of transfers each household receives can be identified. The
income data include not only food aid but also other income from transfers.
The data indicate whether the transfer is from friends/relatives3 or from gov-
ernments/NGOs, and how much each household earns from food-for-work.
Food aid and food-for-work programs differ in their allocation rules but Der-
con and Krishnan (2003) found that “the distinction between food aid and
food-for-work is not as important as expected”. Therefore in this paper I
treat both of them as transfers from governments/NGOs and do not discuss
their differences.
The transfers households hand out is part of their expenditures. Taxes and
contributions to peasant associations are treated as the transfers out to gov-
ernments/NGOs. Transfers out to friends/relatives consist of several cate-
gories: food the household gives out, educational and medical expenses the
household pays for members of other households, contributions to church and
iddir, and contributions for livestock loss (Erteban)4.
In the first round (94a) and fourth round (97) surveys, transfers received/handed
out four months before the surveys were recorded. For comparison purposes,
in this paper I use the transfers recorded in the surveys of 94a, 95 and 97
since the transfers recorded in these surveys are from comparable seasons
and the data in the survey of 95 are adjusted if the time between survey 94b
and 95 is not four months.
The descriptive statistics of the transfers are given in Table 2. There are
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three characteristics of the transfers that should be noted from Table 2.
First, there are a few observations with very high levels of transfers which
we can see from the big differences between the 99th percentiles and the
maxima. These observations with very high levels of transfers may appear
because of two reasons. One is measurement error. Another reason is prob-
ably that these observations are very special cases. For example, a member
of the household got a heritage from a rich relative. Second, the amount of
“food given out” is large compared to other transfers. Since only the amount
of food given out one week before each survey was asked, I consider these
data to be noisy and exclude them from the later analyses. The third point
we should notice is that the levels of the transfers are in general low. The
medians are probably better measures of the level than the means. Compar-
ing to the level of the income in Table 1, transfers only count for less than
15 percent of the income if the medians are multiplied by 3 (to compare this
four month figure with the yearly number). Of course the effectiveness of the
transfers depends not only on levels but also on distributions. In Table 3, I
list the medians of income and the percentages of households which receive
or hand out transfers in each village each year. It is clear from the table that
a high percentage of households hand out transfers, which does not depend
on location, but for transfers in it is location-dependent no matter where
the transfers are from. Comparing the medians of income to the percent-
ages of households which receive and hand out transfers in villages, I find
some evidence of targeting. For example, in the rich village Sirbana Godeti
almost all the households transfer out and the village Shumsha in which a
high percentage of the households receive transfers from governments/NGOs
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is a relatively poor village. Evidence on targeting the village suffering from
negative shocks can also be found. For example, the income in Geblen in
97 is much lower than that in the other two years so 63% of the households
in the village get transfers from governments/NGOs. However, Table 3 also
shows that not all the poor villages and villages which are suffering from
negative shocks are reached by transfers.
3 The effects of transfers, risk pooling and
redistribution
3.1 Econometric specification
In this section, I construct two kinds of shocks: covariant income shocks and
idiosyncratic income shocks. Several ways have been used in the literature
to measure income shocks. Rosenzweig (1998) uses the difference between a
household’s income and its mean income over a nine-year panel. Jacoby and
Skoufias (1997) define the deviation of the change in log full income from
the village-season-year mean change as the idiosyncratic shock and the mean
change itself as the aggregate shock. Kochar (1999) measures the income
shocks as the residual in a regression of crop profits on a household fixed
effect, lagged income and the amount of land. Similar to Kochar (1999), I
define my income shocks as the difference between household income yt (ex-
cluding transfers) at period t and the household’s expected income Et−1yt
(excluding transfers) at period t − 1 as determined from a regression of yt
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on a set of income determinants. Income depends on three components:
capital, labor and land. In the ERHS context, capital takes the form of live-
stock. Demographic variables and other household characteristics are used
as additional predictors. As mentioned in section 2, the data contain some
information about income related shocks so they are also included in the
regressors. Using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) as the form of
the income function5, household income is modeled as
yvht = (α1k
−ρ
vht−1 + α2lab
−ρ
vht−1 + α3lan
−ρ
vht−1)
− τ
ρ
exp(
∑
i
ηiai,vht−1 +
∑
j
φjcj,vh +
∑
p
λpwp,vht
+
∑
q
χqoq,vht + evht) (1)
labvht−1 = mvht−1 + β1fvht−1 + β2chvht−1 (2)
where v, h, t are indexes of village, household, time respectively and αi, βi,
ηi, φj, λp and χq are coefficients. The parameter τ is the scale return of
production and ρ is the substitution parameter. The variable y is household
income excluding transfers, k is livestock, lab the aggregate of the labor in
the household defined in equation (2) and lan is land. The variables m,
f and ch are the male, female and children in the household respectively.
The variables ai and cj denote time-variant and time-invariant additional
predictors respectively6. The definitions of these variables are listed in Table
1. Village dummies are included in the variables cj to capture the village
fixed effect. The variable wp denotes observed weather related shocks and oq
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denotes the other observed shocks. Table 4 lists the definitions of wp and op.
The variable e is the error term.
Expected income Et−1yvht and total income shocks s
y
vht can be now written
as:
Et−1yvht = (α1k
−ρ
vht−1 + α2lab
−ρ
vht−1 + α3lan
−ρ
vht−1)
− τ
ρ
exp(
∑
i
ηiai,vht−1 +
∑
j
φjcj,vh) (3)
s
y
vht = yvht − Et−1yvht
= Et−1yvht(exp(
∑
p
λpwp,vht +
∑
q
χqoq,vht + evht)− 1) (4)
where syvht depends on two parts of the income function: the observed shocks∑
p λpwp,vht +
∑
q χqoq,vht and the error term evht.
It should be noted that in the income function defined in (1) and (2) the error
term e is correlated across households. Since villages dummies are included
in cj, evht can be written as
e
y
vht = lt + gvt + nvht (5)
where lt, gvt and nvht denote the unobserved shocks which affect all the
villages in a certain year, the unobserved village specific shocks and the
unobserved idiosyncratic shocks, respectively.
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Serial correlation is also allowed:
cov(eyvh,94, e
y
vh,95) = σ
2
1 (6)
cov(eyvh,95, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
2 (7)
cov(eyvh,94, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
3 (8)
The model defined in equations (1)-(8) is estimated using Feasible General-
ized Least Squares. The details of the estimation procedure can be found in
Appendix A. Table 5 shows the estimation results of the income function.
From the procedure of estimating the income function, I get the estimates
of lt (denoted by l̂t), gvt (denoted by ĝvt) and nvht (denoted by n̂vht). Sim-
ilarly, I also decompose
∑
p λpwp,vht +
∑
q χqoq,vht into the covariant part
(W covvt + O
cov
vt ) and the idiosyncratic part (W
idi
vht + O
idi
vht) by performing a re-
gression on village-year dummies. Then the total income shocks syvht can be
decomposed into two parts: covariant income shocks scovvht and idiosyncratic
income shocks sidivht as:
scovvht =
W covvt +O
cov
vt + l̂t + ĝvt∑
p λpwp,vht +
∑
q χqoq,vht + evht
s
y
vht (9)
sidivht =
W idivht +O
idi
vht + n̂vht∑
p λpwp,vht +
∑
q χqoq,vht + evht
s
y
vht (10)
To study the relation between transfers, risk and income, I specify the fol-
lowing equation to model the functions of risk pooling and redistribution of
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transfers:
trvht = γ1s
cov
vht + γ2s
idi
vht + θ1(Et−1yvht − Et−1yvt)
+
∑
i
κixi,vht−1 +
∑
i
ξizi,vh + cons+ rvht (11)
where tr is the net transfer the household gets. The control variables are de-
noted by xi and zi, in which village dummies are also included. The constant
term is denoted by cons. The variable r is the error term. The parameters
γi, θi, κi, ξi are coefficients.
To study the function of insurance, I put on the right hand side two shocks7:
scov and sidi, which measure the values of gains (losses) from shocks and γ1,
γ2 measure the contribution of transfers to risk pooling directly.
To capture the role that transfers may play in transferring from rich house-
holds to poor households, I put on the right hand side the difference between
the expected income of the household and the median of the expected income
in the village. If transfers do play a pro-poor role, the households richer than
the village median level will transfer out to the households poorer than the
village median level. Choosing expected income instead of real income here
is based on the asset-based view in measuring poverty since expected income
depends only on the household’s assets and productivity. The parameter θ1
measures the effects of transfers in reallocating income.
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3.2 Results
Table 6 shows the estimation results of equation (11)8. The three columns
show the results for the total transfers, transfers from governments/ NGOs
and transfers from mutual support respectively. Evidence on the two roles
transfers may play (the insurance role and the redistribution role) can be
found in this table. The coefficients γ1 and γ2 measure how much covariant
shocks and idiosyncratic shocks are insured respectively. The coefficient γ1 is
significant in the second column but insignificant in column 3, which means
that covariant shocks are insured by transfers from governments/NGOs but
not by transfers from mutual support. There is evidence that idiosyncratic
shocks are insured by mutual support since γ2 is (marginally) significantly
negative in column 3. Transfers from governments/NGOs are not found to
insure idiosyncratic shocks since γ2 is highly insignificant in column 2. The
coefficient θ1 measures the income redistribution role. I find statistically
significant evidence that transfers go from households with high expected in-
come to the ones with low expected income since θ1 is significant in all three
columns.
The measures of income shocks may suffer from measurement errors and with
the procedure I use to decompose covariant and idiosyncratic shocks, most
of the measurement errors are left to the idiosyncratic shocks. This can be
the reason that the idiosyncratic shocks are found to be insured at a very low
level in Table 6. There may also be omitted variables in the income function
which are correlated with transfers and make the coefficients in equation (11)
not estimated consistently.
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Instrumental variables estimation can control for these problems. Recall from
section 3.1 that shocks depend on three components: the observed weather
related part
∑
p λpwp,vht, the observed part not related to weather
∑
q χqoq,vht
and the unobserved part evht. The weather related part of the shocks is not
possible or very difficult to be influenced by transfers and can be considered
to be exogenous to transfers. The shocks which are not related to weather
usually can be influenced by transfers easily. The unobserved part of the
shocks evht which can be estimated from the residuals of the income func-
tion may suffer from measurement errors and problems caused by omitted
variables in the income regression. Therefore the two parts of the shocks∑
q χqoq,vht and evht are instrumented. Lagged shocks can serve as instru-
ments (i.e.
∑
q χqoq,vh94 as the instrument for
∑
q χqoq,vh95,
∑
q χqoq,vh95 as
the instrument for
∑
q χqoq,vh97, e
y
vh,94 as the instrument for e
y
vh,95 and e
y
vh,95
as the instrument for eyvh,97) as lagged shocks are correlated with the current
shocks and can not be influenced by current transfers.
Table 7 shows the estimation results using instrumental variables. As in Ta-
ble 6, γ1 is significantly negative in column 2 and insignificant in column 3,
γ2 is negative in column 3 (however with a t-value of −1.44, it losses its sig-
nificance as found in Table 6) and it is also insignificantly negative in column
2, and θ1 is negative in all three columns. As expected, when instrumen-
tal variables are used, the idiosyncratic shocks are found to be insured at
a higher level (the absolute values of γ2 become bigger). Transfers are also
found to target the female-headed and old households. The education level
of the head of the household is also found to be significant in column 2. The
better educated households get more transfers from governments/NGOs.
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The findings on risk pooling through mutual support in Table 7 are consis-
tent with what literature has suggested. As stated in Dercon (2005), the
effectiveness of the informal arrangements varies according to the type of
shocks. Additionally, informal risk-sharing networks can only insure idiosyn-
cratic but not covariant shocks, since the networks are mainly restrained
within a certain boundary (e.g. villages). Table 7 shows that households are
indeed not able to insure covariant shocks through transfers as γ1 in column
3 is insignificant, which implies that households in the 15 Ethiopian villages
of the ERHS survey probably do not have sufficient social networks out-
side their villages which can insure the shocks common to the whole village.
Within the boundary, evidence on risk-sharing (though not complete risk-
sharing) has been found for many countries (e.g. Jalan and Ravallion 1999
for China, Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997 for India, De Weedt and Dercon
2006 for Tanzania). However, in these studies the contributions of transfers
on risk-sharing cannot be distinguished from the contributions of other risk-
sharing institutions. Morduch (1999) suggests that transfers from mutual
support only play a minor role in risk-sharing especially where migration is
limited. The risk-sharing of idiosyncratic shocks through mutual support is
indeed found to be very weak in these 15 Ethiopian villages. In Table 6 the
coefficient γ2 in column 3 is only significant at a 10% level and in Table 7 it
losses its significance.
The results show that transfers from governments/NGOs insure covariant
shocks (the coefficient γ1 is significantly negative in column 2) and idiosyn-
cratic shocks are not significantly insured by transfers from governments
and NGOs (γ2 in column 2 is not significant at 10% level in both Table 6
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and Table 7). Different from transfers from mutual support, transfers from
governments/NGOs have the ability to help the households pool covariant
shocks. As just mentioned, households are not able to pool covariant shocks
by relying on their social networks. Thus it is more necessary for the govern-
ments and NGOs to insure common shocks like drought, flood etc. Transfers
from governments and NGOs which target the covariant shocks can always
play a role as a useful safety net to guarantee the effectiveness of the risk-
sharing arrangement, as the system of informal risk-sharing arrangement is
more likely to be down when income is in general low (Coate and Ravallion
1993). There can be two reasons that idiosyncratic shocks are not insured by
transfers from governments/NGOs. First, insuring idiosyncratic shocks are
difficult and costly since idiosyncratic shocks are much more challenging to
be detected. Second, in the communities where well-functioning risk-sharing
arrangements exist, it is not necessary for the governments and NGOs to tar-
get idiosyncratic shocks. As it is obvious in Table 7 that idiosyncratic shocks
are not fully insured by mutual support (from the estimate of γ2 in the third
column), the second reason is certainly not the case. The fact that I find
that idiosyncratic shocks are not significantly insured in column 2 suggests
the difficulty for governments/NGOs to detect the idiosyncratic shocks and
for the transfer to target them.
It is clear from Table 6 and Table 7 that transfers play a role in risk pooling,
cover the vulnerable female-headed and old households and try to transfer
from the rich to the poor. The findings that transfers from different sources
play different roles in insuring covariant and idiosyncratic shocks are con-
sistent with the literature. However, looking at the level of the insurance,
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it is different from what literature has found. With coefficients of −0.0077
and −0.0082 (in column 1), households can only get 0.77% of their losses
from covariant shocks and 0.82% of idiosyncratic shocks as compensation.
As the four months in which transfers are observed are always very close to
the end of the main harvest in Ethiopia, if transfers play a role in insuring
the losses of households in the farming season, the four months immediatly
after the harvest is probably the peak time of compensations. To be opti-
mistic, if we assume that households can get insured at the same level as
in the four months immediately after the main harvest all over the year,
still only 2.31% and 2.46% of their losses from covariant and idiosyncratic
shocks respectively will be compensated by the transfers. In the literature,
for example Townsend (1994) finds that the marginal propensity to consume
out of a household’s own income is smaller than 0.14 using data from South
India, while it is predicted to be zero under perfect risk-sharing. Ravallion
and Chaudhuri (1997) predict it to be between 0.12 and 0.46. In the case of
the current paper, only 2.46% of the losses from idiosyncratic shocks can be
insured by transfers. It should be predicted from this finding that consump-
tion move almost perfectly along with household’s own income (the marginal
propensity to consume out of a household’s own income is close to 1) after
controlling for village average income, if getting transfers is the only way that
these households can use to pool risk. Thus the level of risk-sharing which
has been found in the literature can not be achieved by getting transfers for
the households in the 15 Ethiopian villages I studied.
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4 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of transfers in risk pooling and redistribution in
Ethiopia. It explores how much risk pooling is achieved through transfers
for households in ERHS villages, using a regression based concept of income
shocks. This is different from the literature which tests if the households are
fully insured and gives only yes/no answer. From a regression of transfers
on income shocks, the covariant shocks are found to be partially insured by
transfers from governments/NGOs and transfers from mutual support play a
very weak role in insuring the idiosyncratic shocks. However, the effects are
in both cases very limited.
The results indicate that the aid provided through food aid and food-for-
work programs do not generate much help to the ones who actually need it.
Only the covariant shocks faced by the households are found to be insured
by these transfers at a very low level.
The results also provide insights in the scope for introducing formal insur-
ance. One worry about implementing formal insurance is that it will crowd
out informal insurance which can be a big loss for the households. Results
here have shown that transfers from informal social networks however play
only a small role in risk pooling.
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Appendix A: Estimating the income function
I use Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) to estimate the income
function defined in section 3.1.
yvht = (α1k
−ρ
vht−1 + α2lab
−ρ
vht−1 + α3lan
−ρ
vht−1)
− τ
ρ
exp(
∑
i
ηiai,vht−1 +
∑
j
φjcj,vh +
∑
p
λpwp,vht
+
∑
q
χqoq,vht + evht)
labvht−1 = mvht−1 + β1fvht−1 + β2chvht−1
e
y
vht = lt + gvt + nvht
cov(eyvh,94, e
y
vh,95) = σ
2
1, cov(e
y
vh,95, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
2, cov(e
y
vh,94, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
3
which can be written as:
log(yvht) =
(
−
τ
ρ
)
(α1k
−ρ
vht−1 + α2lab
−ρ
vht−1 + α3lan
−ρ
vht−1)
+
∑
i
ηiai,vht−1 +
∑
j
φjcj,vh +
∑
p
λpwp,vht
+
∑
q
χqoq,vht + evht
labvht−1 = mvht−1 + β1fvht−1 + β2chvht−1
e
y
vht = lt + gvt + nvht
cov(eyvh,94, e
y
vh,95) = σ
2
1, cov(e
y
vh,95, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
2, cov(e
y
vh,94, e
y
vh,97) = σ
2
3
It is obvious that the parameters of this function will not be estimated ef-
ficiently and the estimators of the covariance matrix will not be valid if it
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is estimated by Nonlinear Least Square (NLS) because the error terms are
correlated through lt and gvt and are also serially correlated. I use FGLS
to estimate this function. The Generalized Least Squares estimator of this
function is
(log(y)− ̂log(y))TΩ−1(log(y)− ̂log(y))
where ̂log(y) is the fitted value of log(y).
The essential part of the estimation is to obtain an estimate of Ω. If two
observations are from different years their error terms are not correlated. If
two observations are from the same year and village, the error terms are
correlated through both lt and gvt. If they are only from the same year but
different villages, the error terms are only correlated through lt. They are
also serially correlated.
To get estimates of the covariance matrix, estimates of the variances of the
three components of the shocks are needed. I do this by first estimating the
function using NLS so I can get estimates of eyvht (denoted by ê
y
vht). Then I
use the following steps to obtain the estimates:
1. Regress êy on the year dummies. The fitted values from this regression
are taken as the estimates of lt (l̂t).
2. Run a regression of êyvht − l̂t on the village-year dummies. The fitted
values from this regression are taken as the estimates of gvt (ĝt) and
the residuals are taken the estimates of evht (êvht).
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3. Calculate the variances of l̂t, ĝvt and êvht and plug the variances into
the covariance matrix Ω.
4. Calculate the variances of e94 and e95 as an estimate of θ
2
1 (θ̂
2
1) and
get θ̂22 and θ̂
2
3 in the same way. Plug the variances into the covariance
matrix Ω.
5. Do the FGLS estimation by using the estimate of Ω.
The residuals from this estimation include three components of shocks and
can be used to construct the income shocks.
One problem of this procedure is that I only have data for three years so the
estimation of the variance of lt is probably not accurate. I use a variation of
the estimation procedure to check if this problem is crucial. This procedure
includes the year dummies in the regressors so only the error terms from
the observations from the same years and villages are correlated. The steps
are similar to the first procedure. After doing a NLS estimation, I do the
following steps:
1. Run a regression of êvht on the village-year dummies. The fitted val-
ues from this regression are taken as the estimates of gvt (ĝt) and the
residuals are taken the estimates of evht (êvht).
2. Calculate the variances of ĝvt and êvht and plug in the variances into
the covariance matrix to get a estimate of Ω.
3. Calculate the variances of e94 and e95 as an estimate of θ
2
1 (θ̂
2
1) and
get θ̂22 and θ̂
2
3 in the same way. Plug the variances into the covariance
matrix Ω.
23
4. Do the FGLS estimation by using the estimate of Ω.
The estimates of the income function from this procedure are very similar
to the estimates from the first procedure. Of course in this procedure the
shocks which are common to all the villages in a certain year are not included
in the residuals. I correct this by adding the coefficients of the year dummies
into the residuals. It turns out that the shocks constructed from the two
procedures are very similar. Thus I keep using the shocks constructed from
the first procedure and only report the results from the first procedure in
this paper.
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Notes
1This section mainly draws on Dercon and Krishnan (1998).
2Calculated based on the ERHS data.
3Transfers from organizations like iddir are also included in this category since these
transfers are from households’ social networks and are part of the mutual support.
4Due to the limitation of the data, not all the sources of transfers are included in the
analyses of this paper, e.g. the data do not provide information on transfers through labor
sharing.
5This functional form and the choice of most of the variables are based on Cockburn
(2002).
6Since stratification was used in choosing the surveyed households, in order to pool
all the observations dummy variables to capture the landless and female households are
included in ai.
7One may argue that the study can be done by putting the observed shocks directly
into equation (11) and there is no need to construct scov and sidi. There are two reasons
that makes the method described in this paper being preferred. First, only a subset of the
shocks are observed. Second, most of the observed shocks are only qualitative measures
of the shocks. The method used in this paper provides a way to measure the shocks
quantitatively and integrate all the shocks into two measures.
8As mentioned in section 2, extreme values of transfers are observed for some of the
households. These observations may change the results of the estimation. To detect
outliers, I use two criteria: 1. Studentized residuals, Cook’s distance, leverage, DFITS
or DFBETA of scov
vht
, sidi
vht
, Et−1yvht − Et−1yvt exceed their cutoffs. 2. Household income
is in the highest or lowest percentiles, or livestock the household owns is in the highest
percentile, or land the household owns is in the highest percentile, or total transfers of
the household is in the highest or lowest percentiles. If both criteria are satisfied, the
observation is considered to be an outlier and is deleted from the analysis.
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Variable Definition Mean(1)
income (y) Household income excluding transfers (in Birr) 2933.32
male (m) Male household members (age≥16) 1.48
female (f) Female household members (age≥16) 1.54
child (ch) Household members aged in 6 to 15 1.81
livestock (k) Value of the livestocks owned by the household (in Birr) divided by 1000 2.06
land (lan) Land owned by the household (in hectares) 2.49
other assets Value of other productive assets (hoes, plows, etc.) owned by household (in Birr) 52.65
landless Dummy:=1 if household has no land; 0 if not 0.09
lem Share of land which is lem (good land) 0.42
coffee Dummy:=1 if household has (a) coffee plant(s); 0 if not 0.27
chat Dummy:=1 if household has (a) chat plant(s); 0 if not 0.13
enset Dummy:=1 if household has (a) enset plant(s); 0 if not 0.29
eucalyptus Dummy:=1 if household has (a) eucalyptus plant(s); 0 if not 0.34
fel head Dummy:=1 if household head is female; 0 if not 0.21
age Age of household head 46.40
education Years of education of household head 1.52
haresaw Dummy:=1 if household in Haresaw site; 0 if not 0.05
geblen Dummy:=1 if household in Geblen site; 0 if not 0.04
dinki Dummy:=1 if household in Dinki site; 0 if not 0.06
debre Dummy:=1 if household in Debre Berhan site; 0 if not 0.13
yetmen Dummy:=1 if household in Yetmen site; 0 if not 0.04
shumsha Dummy:=1 if household in Shumsha site; 0 if not 0.09
sirbana Dummy:=1 if household in Sirbana Godeti site; 0 if not 0.07
adele Dummy:=1 if household in Adele Keke site; 0 if not 0.07
korod Dummy:=1 if household in Koro-degaga site; 0 if not 0.08
turfe Dummy:=1 if household in Turfe Kechemane site; 0 if not 0.07
imdibir Dummy:=1 if household in Imdibir site; 0 if not 0.05
azedeboa Dummy:=1 if household in Aze Deboa site; 0 if not 0.05
addado Dummy:=1 if household in Addado site; 0 if not 0.09
garagodo Dummy:=1 if household in Gara Godo site; 0 if not 0.07
doma Dummy:=1 if household in Doma site; 0 if not 0.05
obs. 4164(2)
(1) Calculated based on the ERHS data.
(2) Observations with missing values are not included.
Table 1: Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables
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Variable(1) Obs.(2) Mean Median S.D. 99th percentile Max
Transfer in from governments/NGOs 445 112 47 687 492 14319
Food for work 242 120 76 128 603 955
Transfer in from friends/relatives 438 150 48 343 1969 3518
Transfer out to governments/NGOs 2075 28 19 59 187 1396
Transfer out to friends/relatives 3136 24 11 47 187 1081
Food given out 224 584 331 707 3494 4387
(1) All the statistics are based on the amount of transfers for four months and the unit is Birr.
(2) All the statistics are calculated only based on nonzero observations.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the transfers
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Village Year Medians of Governments/NGOs(1) Friends/Relatives(2)
income Transfers in Food for work Transfers out Transfers in Transfers out
Haresaw 94 1095.91 0% 62% 24% 4% 38%
95 459.63 5% 23% 25% 1% 25%
97 1169.37 3% 15% 57% 12% 72%
Geblen 94 528.59 2% 78% 2% 0% 13%
95 333.53 2% 2% 0% 0% 0%
97 135.30 63% 5% 34% 2% 27%
Dinki 94 576.93 0% 0% 49% 1% 32%
95 155.43 0% 0% 32% 3% 20%
97 966.99 0% 0% 5% 4% 47%
Debre Berhan 94 3054.38 1% 0% 69% 7% 78%
95 1596.62 2% 0% 88% 1% 88%
97 2877.65 0% 0% 19% 6% 94%
Yetmen 94 1587.66 0% 0% 89% 0% 60%
95 2158.67 0% 0% 89% 5% 74%
97 3460.27 0% 2% 22% 5% 65%
Shumsha 94 688.81 96% 0% 81% 3% 87%
95 783.93 60% 1% 72% 8% 86%
97 1049.13 55% 0% 8% 3% 90%
Sirbana Godeti 94 3716.10 1% 0% 87% 1% 96%
95 3357.37 0% 0% 81% 4% 96%
97 3645.70 1% 0% 73% 3% 100%
Adele Keke 94 1689.40 0% 21% 71% 8% 34%
95 2261.75 0% 1% 19% 18% 35%
97 2765.88 59% 1% 78% 6% 70%
Koro-degaga 94 1053.29 1% 0% 94% 28% 89%
95 1970.04 17% 0% 82% 28% 92%
97 2626.24 3% 0% 40% 20% 89%
Turfe Kechemane 94 2508.12 3% 0% 16% 19% 93%
95 3786.64 1% 12% 90% 19% 91%
97 3861.68 0% 0% 1% 10% 96%
Imdibir 94 4354.49 1% 6% 3% 10% 99%
95 1431.07 13% 51% 52% 31% 97%
97 1524.17 18% 0% 47% 40% 98%
Aze Deboa 94 1287.19 0% 0% 5% 14% 90%
95 1750.93 3% 0% 69% 13% 100%
97 2154.76 1% 0% 4% 19% 97%
Addado 94 1307.87 1% 0% 63% 1% 76%
95 2002.86 0% 0% 55% 2% 71%
97 3081.92 0% 0% 38% 5% 95%
Gara Godo 94 592.18 0% 1% 71% 13% 93%
95 933.89 0% 12% 74% 4% 84%
97 1199.34 7% 1% 3% 96% 97%
Doma 94 858.78 1% 0% 74% 1% 56%
95 455.94 4% 73% 34% 3% 34%
97 1036.05 2% 0% 16% 0% 50%
(1) Source: Calculated based on the ERHS data.
(2) Food given out is excluded from transfers out to friends/relatives.
Table 3: Percentages of households which received and handed out transfers
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Variable Definition
w1 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that the rain came on time in the previous farming season; 0 if not
w2 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that there was enough rain in the previous farming season; 0 if not
w3 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that the rain stopped on time in the previous farming season; 0 if
not
w4 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that there was rain in the harvest in the previous farming season; 0
if not
w5 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from low temperature in the previous farming
season; 0 if not
w6 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from wind/storm in the previous farming season;
0 if not
w7 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from flooding/water logging in the previous
farming season; 0 if not
o1 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from diseases in the previous farming season; 0
if not
o2 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from livestock eating/trampling in the previous
farming season; 0 if not
o3 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from birds/other animals in the previous farming
season; 0 if not
o4 Dummy:=1 if the household reported that crops suffered from weed damage in the previous farming season;
0 if not
o5 The size of land which was allocated to the three crops which were reported by households to be most
affected by weather, insects, diseases etc. weighted by the severity of the affection
o6 livestock shock:
bvht−dvht
kvh,t−1
, where bvht is the birth of livestock in value and dvht is the death of livestock
in value
o7
dhvht
hhsizevh,t−1
, where dhvht is the number of household member who died and hhsizevh,t−1 is the size of
household in the beginning of the year
o8
joinvht
hhsizevh,t−1
, where joinvht is the number of household member who joined the household and
hhsizevh,t−1 is the size of household in the beginning of the year
Table 4: Definitions of variables of observed shocks
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Dependent variable income
Variable Coef.(1) t-statistic
scale returns (τ) 0.643∗∗∗ 16.04
substitution (ρ) −0.486∗∗∗ −6.60
livestock (α1) 0.269
∗∗∗ 7.31
labor (α2) 0.447
∗∗∗ 9.69
land (α
(2)
3 ) 0.284
female (β1) 0.411
∗∗∗ 3.85
kid (β2) 0.281
∗∗∗ 3.77
landless 0.262∗∗ 2.57
lem 0.100∗∗ 2.43
coffee 0.406∗∗∗ 5.62
chat 0.340∗∗∗ 4.62
enset −0.051 −0.67
eucalyptus 0.091∗∗ 2.26
fel head −0.129∗∗∗ −2.62
age −0.005∗∗∗ −4.09
education 0.031∗∗∗ 4.53
haresaw −0.479∗∗ −2.06
geblen −1.263∗∗∗ −5.33
dinki −1.001∗∗∗ −4.30
yetmen −0.009 −0.04
shumsha −0.502∗∗ −2.21
sirbana 0.532∗∗ 2.33
adele 0.175 0.73
korod −0.092 −0.40
turfe 0.469∗∗ 2.00
imdibir −0.099 −0.38
azedeboa −0.383 −1.53
addado 0.330 1.31
garagodo −0.724∗∗∗ −2.95
doma −0.665∗∗∗ −2.82
cons. 6.988∗∗∗ −35.60
observed shocks not reported
obs. 4164
R-squared 0.44
(1) ∗ significant at 10% level;∗∗ significant at 5% level;
∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1% level.
(2) α3 = 1− α1 − α2.
Table 5: Estimation results of the income function
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Dependent variables Total Net transfers from Net transfers
net transfers(1) governments/NGOs from mutual support
scovvht (γ1) −0.0065
∗∗∗
(−3.85)(2)
−0.0049∗∗∗
(−4.10)
−0.0016
(−1.37)
sidivht (γ2) −0.0006
(−1.27)
0.00003
(0.07)
−0.0006∗
(−1.90)
Et−1yvht − Et−1yvt (θ1) −0.0065
∗∗∗
(−4.04)
−0.0025∗∗
(−2.18)
−0.0040∗∗∗
(−3.60)
landless 0.2386
(0.06)
−2.2147
(−0.80)
2.4533
(0.91)
lem −0.1345
(−0.05)
−2.6275
(−1.31)
2.4930
(1.28)
coffee −3.8029
(−0.75)
−2.3128
(−0.64)
−1.4901
(−0.43)
chat −4.8954
(−0.96)
−6.4098∗
(−1.76)
1.5145
(0.43)
enset −4.2776
(−0.82)
1.7144
(0.46)
−5.9920∗
(−1.65)
eucalyptus −5.2517∗
(−1.91)
−2.1906
(−1.12)
−3.0611
(−1.61)
fel head 3.1616
(1.14)
−2.2478
(−1.15)
5.4094∗∗∗
(2.82)
age 0.1714∗∗
(2.48)
0.0881∗
(1.80)
0.0833∗
(1.74)
education 0.5179
(1.16)
0.5024
(1.58)
0.0155
(0.05)
cons −18.3729∗∗∗
(−3.51)
−8.5793∗∗
(−2.31)
−9.7936∗∗∗
(−2.71)
village dummies not reported
obs. 4076 4076 4076
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.8
(1) ∗ significant at 10% level; ∗∗ significant at 5% level; ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1% level.
(2) t-statistics are in the brackets.
Table 6: Estimation results of equation (11)
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Dependent variables Total Net transfers from Net transfers
net transfers(1) governments/NGOs from mutual support
scovvht (γ1) −0.0077
∗∗
(−2.07)(2)
−0.0057∗∗
(−2.37)
−0.0021
(−0.74)
sidivht (γ2) −0.0082
∗
(−1.83)
−0.0034
(−1.19)
−0.0048
(−1.44)
Et−1yvht − Et−1yvt (θ1) −0.0061
∗∗∗
(−3.16)
−0.0019
(−1.50)
−0.0043∗∗∗
(−2.94)
landless −0.9499
(−0.21)
0.225
(0.08)
−1.1749
(−0.34)
lem −0.9074
(−0.28)
−1.556
(−0.76)
0.6486
(0.27)
coffee −4.5687
(−0.78)
−3.5239
(−0.94)
−1.0449
(−0.24)
chat −0.2602
(−0.05)
−4.4131
(−1.23)
4.1529
(1.00)
enset −3.3021
(−0.55)
1.8322
(0.48)
−5.1342
(−1.15)
eucalyptus −7.5193∗∗
(−2.43)
−4.1351∗∗
(−2.09)
−3.3842
(−1.46)
fel head 13.1341∗∗∗
(4.16)
5.2309∗∗∗
(2.59)
7.9032∗∗∗
(3.35)
age 0.2157∗∗∗
(2.74)
0.0912∗
(1.81)
0.1245∗∗
(2.12)
education 0.8032
(1.58)
0.5651∗
(1.74)
0.2381
(0.63)
cons −20.6633∗∗∗
(−3.40)
−7.1730∗
(−1.84)
−13.4903∗∗∗
(−2.97)
village dummies not reported
obs. 2582 2582 2582
R-squared 0.16 0.10 0.16
(1) ∗ significant at 10% level; ∗∗ significant at 5% level; ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1% level.
(2) t-statistics are in the brackets.
Table 7: Results of IV estimation of equation (11)
35
